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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
ROBZRT W. HMP mH=L*
For the 1955 Survey we have endeavored to include not only (1)
Substantive Criminal Law and (2) Criminal Procedure, but (3) Acts
of the General Assembly, 1955, having a direct bearing on the crimi-
nal practice, and (4) preview of cases which the practitioner may
look forward to, either pending before or on appeal to the South
Carolina Supreme Court.
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRImiNAL LAW
Perjury
In State v. Crowley,' in re-emphasizing the requisite quantum that
the falsity of the statement laid in the indictment cannot be proved
by the testimony of only one witness unless that testimony is cor-
roborated by other evidence in the case, and that the other evidence
might be corroborating circumstances, the Supreme Court affirmed
a conviction where the perjuries were established by the testimony
of the investigating officers and others, by appellant's sworn state-
ment and by corroborating circumstances. The entire testimony of
a previous trial at which the alleged perjury had taken place, was
introduced in evidence by the State, and the lower court allowed,
and the Supreme Court affirmed, the reading from the introduced
record to the jury.
Rape- Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature
In State v. Christopher M. Henderson,2 defendant was charged
with rape which included a third count of assault and battery of
a high and aggravated nature. All parties admitted penetration of
the person of the prosecuting witness. The jury convicted him of
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and the de-
fendant took the position that since the penetration was admitted,
there could be no assault and battery of a high and aggravated
nature. Reversal was refused upon this ground because of the
fact that the question was raised for the first time in the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court, but in a strong dissenting opinion Associate
QSolicltor, Sith South Carolina judicial Circuit; Member firm Hemphill & Hemphill,
Chester, S. C.- Member General Assembly 1947-1943; Member Chester County, South
Carolina and American Bar Associations.
1. 85 S.E. 2d 714 (S.C. 1955).
2. 226 S.C. 227, 84 S.E. 2d 626 (1954).
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Justice Taylor urged a reversal on the ground that since there had
been an admitted penetration, the question resolved itself into a
question of rape or no rape. The case was reversed on the grounds
that the presiding judge failed to charge the jury, when they requested
additional instructions, that if the prosecutrix consented, there could
be no assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature.
Corpus Delicti in Murder-Larceny
In the second appeal in the case of State v. Arthur Waitus,3 appel-
lant challenged the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delicti, which
in the crime of murder consists of (1) the death of a human being and
(2) causative criminal act or agency of another. The fact that the
hidden lifeless victim was found a few hours after death and the
post m6rtem disclosed external and internal proof of death by stran-
gulation which indicated the application of external force was held
to have proved corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.
Corpus Delicti as to larceny was discussed in State v. Teal,4 as
consisting of the elements of (a) the loss of property by the owner,
and (b) loss by felonious taking. The court defined corpus delicti
as meaning, when applied to any particular offense, "that the specific
crime has actually been committed", and recognized stare decisis in
the rule that the conviction cannot be had upon the extra-judicial
confessions of the defendant unless corroborated by other proof of
corpus delicti. Appellant had confessed, and counsel took the posi-
tion that his confession was admitted before sufficient proof of the
corpus delicti by other means had been shown. The opinion details
some of the testimony sufficient to support the proof of corpus delicti.
Forgery
In State v. Orr,5 it was held that to constitute forgery the name
alleged to be forged need not be that of any person in existence and
that one found in possession of a forged instrument of which he pur-
ports to be the beneficiary, and who applied it to his own use, must
in the absence of explanation satisfactory to the jury, be presumed
to have forged it or to have been privy to its forgery.
Rape-Degree of Force
In the celebrated case of State v. Whitener,6 the court went into
an exhaustive history of the crimes and elements of the crimes of
3. 226 S.C. 44, 83 S.E. 2d 629 (1954).
4. 225 S.C. 472, 82 S.E. 2d 787 (1954).
5. 225 S.C. 369, 82 S.E. 2d 523 (1954).
6 ......... S.E  2d ........ (S C. 1955).
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what we knew and now know as common law rape7 and statutory
rape.8 Appellant had taken the position that there was no force
used by him in the commission of the crime accused of, he having
been convicted of common law rape, in a case in which he asked the
court, after successfully moving for an election to leave in the in-
dictment both the counts of common law rape and statutory rape.
Associate Justice Legge traced the history and development of our
statutes, and, for the court, defined that the force used may be actual
or constructive and the degree of force and of resistance required to
characterize the act of rape must, of necessity, vary with the circum-
stances of the particular case. Sexual intercourse with a woman
who is unconscious or insane is rape, and neither force nor resistance
is necessary to constitute the offense. It was held that where the
female was under the age of consent, force and resistance are im-
material and not necessary to constitute the offense and to constitute
the offense as to a female below the age of consent the only material
elements to be proved are the carnal knowledge and the age of the
female.
When the female is under the age of fourteen and unmarried,
the only other element necessary to be proven in order to establish
the crime of rape is the fact that defendant had sexual intercourse
with her. Where she is under the age of sixteen, the only other ele-
ment necessary to be proven in order to establish the crime of carnal
knowledge under Section 16-80 is the fact that defendant had inter-
course with the prosecutrix. In neither case is it necessary for the
State to prove force, or want of consent; the conviction was affirmed.
Presumption from Possession of Stolen Property
In State v. Colenan,9 defendant's conviction of larceny of an out-
board motor was affirmed in an opinion that reaffirmed the rule that
possession of recently stolen property, in the absence of explanation
consistent with innocence, raises a presumption of guilt of larceny of
the property, and will authorize and substantiate a conviction thereof.
Appellant never was able to satisfactorily explain his acquisition of
the admittedly stolen property.
Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide - Elements
In State v. Phillips,'0 which arose on a question of the jurisdiction
of the County Court for Greenville County, South Carolina, the court
7. CODE OF LAws or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 16-71.
8. CODE OF LAWS O1 SouTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 16-80.
9. 86 S.E. 2d 484 (S.C. 1955).
10. 226 S.C. 297, 84 S.E. 2d 855 (1954).
[Vol. 8
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redefined the necessary elements of involuntary manslaughter, as op-
posed to the necessary elements of reckless homicide. The court
said that in automobile homicide cases, not involving the elements of
murder, the accused may be prosecuted for reckless homicide, in
which event the State must show recklessness, or something more than
the mere failure to exercise due care - and when a conviction is
sought for involuntary manslaughter, the State need only show simple
negligence which is sufficient for a conviction. The County Court
of Greenville County was held to have had no jurisdiction to try a
reckless homicide case since the degree of negligence required was
greater than that required for involuntary manslaughter.
Assault with Intent to Ravish-Includes Lesser Offenses
In State v. Shea,11 appellant was tried upon an indictment which
contained two counts, to-wit: (1) Assault with Intent to Ravish;
and (2) Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature. He
was convicted on the latter. The prosecuting witness testified that
she was sweeping her porch when appellant appeared in her yard
and made advances to her. She testified that he got hold of her
shoulder, pulled her to him and forced a kiss upon her and tried to
get her to go into a nearby house with him, but she refused and asked
him to leave. She also testified that she was not hurt in any way,
bruised in any way, nor were her clothes torn, nor did the defendant
try to put his hands where his hands should not have been. Under
this evidence it was held that the issue of simple assault and battery,
as a lesser offense, was included in the greater offense as charged,
and should have been submitted to the jury, because there was some
evidence tending to show that the defendant was only guilty of simple
assault and battery. The conviction was reversed.
To this same import is State v. Self,I2 in which the court said that
where one is charged with the crime of assault and battery with in-
tent to kill, there is ordinarily included, as a part of the offense of as-
sault and battery, divided through common usage into three degrees,
the additional crimes of assault and battery of a high and aggravated
nature and simple assault and battery. The court went on to define
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature as an unlawful
act of violent injury to the person of another, accompanied by cir-
cumstances of aggravation, such as the use of a deadly weapon,
infliction of serious bodily injury, attempt to commit a greater felony,
great disparity between the ages and physical conditions of the par-
11. 85 S.E. 2d 858 (S.C. 1955).
12. 225 S.C. 267, 82 S.E. 2d 63 (1954).
19551
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ties, difference in sexes, indecent liberties, et cetera. The court
went on to say that where the testimony was that the prosecutrix was
hit with something like a black-jack and robbed, that it was unneces-
sary, under the charge of assault and battery with intent to ldll, to
charge simple assault, but it was necessary to charge assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature.
The two cases above may be easily distinguished because in one
case there was no doubt about the fact that the prosecuting witness
was badly hurt, and in the other case the prosecuting witness testified
that she was not hurt in any way. The violence of the blow alone,
as testified to in the Self case, would be sufficient, as the opinion is
interpreted, to remove the cause from the realm of simple assault and
battery to that of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Confessions - Evidence - The Fifth Amendment
The past decade has seen more concentrated discussion about free-
dom than at any time since 1776. From congressional investigations,
up and down the line, the investigator and investigated proclaim with
considerable passion and questionable oratory that the future of this
nation depends upon the preservation of the basic freedoms con-
tained in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. The
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution has been much
in the news, and, in parallel Article I, Section 17, of the South Caro-
lina Constitution of 1895, which guarantees the same personal liberty.
In this State no legal implication may be properly drawn in a criminal
proceeding from the refusal to answer, and it is elementary that the
accused may remain silent and the prosecution may not even comment
on the fact.
Up to this time there has been no decision by the Supreme Court
of South Carolina concerning the obligation of an innocent accused
not to remain silent. Granted that the object of any controversy in
the court is to arrive at the truth and apply the legal principles to
that truth, what has the innocent to fear from telling the truth?
South Carolina cases in the last year have evidenced new zeal in
an attack on confessions, which the investigator depends on more and
more. We have discussed the Crowley case, stating the cardinal
principle that extra-judicial confessions, uncorroborated, are insuffi-
cient to prove the corpus delicti. This was followed, in a general way,
by dicta in State v. Vernon Ned Sanders.1 3 In the Sanders case the
13 ......... S. . 2d ........ (S.C. 1955).
Vol. 8
5
Hemphill: Criminal Law and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SURVEY O SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
confession was attacked as compulsory and involuntary because same
was taken before a Notary Public. The court said that the test of
the confession is not whether it is sworn to or not, but whether the
statement was free and voluntary. To the same end is State v.
Waitus1 4 in which the court applied the same test, stating that the
question of whether or not the confession is voluntary is first ad-
dressed to the court who shall allow testimony as to same if apparent-
ly voluntary, but if the evidence with respect to same is conflicting
the jury must be the final arbiter of such fact, and if the jury decides
it voluntary, the second test is also met.
In the Waitus case, there was a question as to the admission of
the shoes of the appellant, which fitted into the tracks at the scene
of the crime, and were later introduced in evidence. The shoes were
held to be admissible, and it is evident that counsel intended to
raise the issue, by their objection, that the introduction of the shoes
would be causing appellant, by his property, since Waitus had never
,directly consented to their use or introduction, to testify against him-
self; since, insofar as appellant was concerned, the shoes were taken
from him involuntarily, same would, theoretically, be compelling ac-
cused to testify against himself. The question of physical evidence
was raised directly in the case of State v. Greene,15 in which the
accused was given a physical examination immediately after his ar-
rest upon the charge of rape. Counsel raised the question of whether
compulsory physical examination did not deprive defendant of due
process of law by requiring him to incriminate himself in violation
of the State and Federal Constitutions as hereinabove discussed. The
Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the protection of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 17, of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895, did not ex-
tend to the exclusion of evidence obtained through search of a de-
fendant or an examination of his person unaided by his enforced
-testimony or positive action. In the Greene case, supra, the court
went on to say that in every case where confession is obtained by an
officer, the conduct of the officer obtaining the confession will be
rigidly scrutinized in order that the court may determine, before ad-
mitting it in evidence, that it was made freely, voluntarily and un-
influenced by threats or other inducements.
The Greene case is also authority for the fact that although an ac-
cused was not advised beforehand that he need make no statement
or warned that what he might say would be used against him, the
14. See note 3 supra.
15. 86 S.E. 2d 598 (S.C. 1955).
19551
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absence of such warning or advice does not render a voluntary con-
fession inadmissible. Again we come to the test of whether the
confession is voluntary or involuntary.
In the recent case of State v. James Eugene Smith,16 appellant
took the position that the trial court was in error in admitting the
testimony of an oral confession made the day after defendant had
made a written confession. Citing State v. Branham,17 in which the
court said the best evidence upon the subject is the written confession,
the court went on to say that a confession or confessions may betake
of many forms, such as a statement of one's own part in the crime,
a series of questions and answers, a letter or letters, detached con-
versations, a formal conversation of one or more, and in the event
several confessions related to the same subject, all are admissible.
Again the test applied was the test of whether the confession, whether
oral or written, was voluntary. It so happened that the Smith case
was reversed because the word "may" was used with reference to
whether or not there had been any contradiction and the word "shall"
as to whether or not there bad been any corroboration, the court
saying that the jury should take into consideration both questions.
In the recent case18 reported in the July 1955 American Bar Asso-
ciation Journal, the Supreme Court of the United States approved
the conviction for contempt of a former New York City policeman.
who refused to answer the Grand Jury's questions about receiving
bribes from gamblers. New York State has a statute similar to our
constitutional provision providing for a witness' immunity from prose-
cution for any criminal activity revealed by his testimony, and the de-
fendant signed a waiver of this immunity while a policeman under a
provision of the Charter of the City of New York. After his discharge
he was called before the Grand Jury and questioned and refused to
answer. He was indicted and convicted of criminal contempt. The ma-
jority opinion by Mir. Justice Reed affirmed the conviction, holding
that, if the waiver was valid, any testimony defendant gave could be
used as a basis for prosecution, as a result of his voluntary choice to
waive his immunity; but on the other hand, if the waiver was invalid,
then the referred-to Statute of the State of New York protected him
from prosecution and therefore he was obliged to testify before the
Grand Jury. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas joined in a
strong dissenting opinion in which it was held that by compelling de-
fendant to testify, he was being deprived of his constitutional rights,
and the dissenting opinion also expressed the doubt as to whether or
16. 88 S.E. 2d 345 (S.C. 1955).
17. 13 S.C. 389 (1879).
18. Regan v. New York, 349 U.S. 58, 99 L.Ed. 494, 75 S.Ct. 585 (1955).
[Vol. &
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not a waiver of this type could be used to bargain away, in advance,
the benefits of the Bill of Rights.
To date, in this State, the decisions reported do not reflect any
case in which there has been raised an objection to a written con-
fession on the ground that same constituted a statement of the de-
fendant, and, if defendant objected to same, then defendant was
objecting to testimony given or to be given by himself against him-
self. The prosecution will probably counter with an argument that
by giving a voluntary confession, he had waived his right to claim
his constitutional immunity, to which would be replied the argument
that a citizen cannot waive his constitutional privileges. In such
event, the question would probably resolve into whether or not, when
given, the alleged confession was voluntary or involuntary. So far,
our Supreme Court has not gone so far as to say that where a con-
fession has been introduced, if the defendant contends that the con-
fession is erroneous, and does not express the truth, then, if the
defendant knows the truth, he has a duty or obligation not to remain
silent.
Separation or Sequestration
In State v. Williams,'9 a conviction was reversed for error in the
trial judge's failure to allow defendant's motion for sequestration of
witnesses. The court said that ordinarily granting or refusing of
such a motion is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and
is not demandable as a matter of right, but in the particular case
some of the defendant's witnesses were prisoners serving current
sentences under guard who appeared as witnesses for the prosecution,
and the court held that those prisoners were bound to have hesitated
in directly contradicting the guards' testimony when they had to con-
tinue the service of their sentence under the particular guards, and
that to refuse sequestration in such a setting or situation was er-
roneous. In a concurring opinion Associate Justice Oxner opined,
concurred in by a majority of the court, that a motion of sequestra-
tion should rarely be denied in capital and other serious criminal
cases, but that such motion should be specific and supported by some
reason when made. In later commenting on the Williams case, in
State v. Vernon Ned Sanders,20 Associate Justice Stukes commented:
"It (Williams case) involved the unusual fact that the defendant's
witnesses were prisoners in the custody of the County Chaingang
guards who were State's witnesses."
19. 85 S.E. 2d 863 (S.C. 1955).
20. See note 13 supra.
19551
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Arguments of Counsel
In State v. Hinson, et al.,21 Appellants were charged with rape.
They admitted that they went to the scene of the alleged crime for
the purpose of robbery, but denied the rape. Associate counsel for
the State, in the opening argument referred to appellants as "crimi-
nals and robbers" and it was objected to at the trial, and made ex-
ception to before the Supreme Court, that this was prejudicial argu-
ment. The court said that since they had admitted the robbery, it
was permissible for counsel to argue the fact as bearing upon the
credibility of their testimony. Appellants also took the position that
since, at the time the objection was made, it was in the presence of
the jury, and the court said that since they admitted they were guilty
of robbery and for that reason were not worthy of belief, it was a
legitimate argument, that such was prejudicial, but the Supreme Court
found that the trial judge made no such statement in front of the
jury, but if he had done so, it would have been prejudicial.
Law of Habitation and Retreat - Self Defense
In State v. Elmore Smith,22 defendant was convicted of assault
and battery of a high and aggravated nature. The prosecuting wit-
ness was allegedly assaulted while a guest in the home where the
accused lived; the Supreme Court held that if defendant lived in the
home, he was not bound to retreat, although he had no right to eject
an assailant who was a guest of the owner. The trial court had
charged defendant had a duty to retreat and the conviction was re-
versed on the ground that the inclusion of such charge was erroneous.
Motion for New Trial - Time and Jurisdiction
In State v. Jones,23 the defendant pleaded guilty before the presid-
ing judge, who imposed sentence. Later, while the presiding judge
was still in the circuit, and after the adjournment of the term at
which the defendant had pleaded guilty, a motion in behalf of defen-
dant was made for a new trial based on facts and circumstances, and
supported by affidavits of facts, or alleged facts, occurring at and im-
mediately connected with the entering of the plea of guilty by de-
fendant and his subsequent sentence. This motion was made before
the resident judge of the circuit about two weeks after adjourn-
ment of the term at which the plea was taken. The court said
that whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon facts occurring
21. 85 S.E. 2d 735 (S.C. 1955).
22. 85 S.E. 2d 409 (S.C. 1955).
23. 225 S.C. 508, 83 S.E. 2d 179 (1954).
[Vol. 8
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at the trial, or immediately connected therewith, the motion must be
made before the adjournment of the term and settled by the judge
who tried the case. Such was not done in this instance. The resi-
dent judge granted the motion, but the Supreme Court, on appeal by
the State, set aside the order granting the motion and reinstated
the sentence.
The opinion by Judge Mann contains an interesting discussion of
the ancient common law principle of coram nobis; Judge Mann deter-
mined, with and for the court, that, in the passing of the sentence
and in the events surrounding same, defendant had been deprived
of no substantial legal right. By dicta the court went on to say that
if the solicitor, or other person in authority, had advised defendant
not to obtain counsel, and as a result defendant did not obtain coun-
sel, such advice, under certain circumstances could be interpreted as
advising or. depriving defendant of a substantial legal right, or corant
nobis, which under such circumstances would result in the granting
of a new trial.
III. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Milk Distribution Bill-A Misdemeanor Created
Evidently sponsored by the South Carolina Dairy Commission, the
1955 General Assembly by an act approved May 11, 1955, which,
after reciting certain legislative findings of fact, making necessary or
proper, as a part of the police power of the State, the regulation of
milk distribution, provided for the licensing of milk distributors by
the Dairy Commission, provided certain powers by the Commission
in relation thereto, including rigid control and the power to make
administrative rulings and regulations, hold hearings, etc., and defined
and made unlawful certain "unfair practices". Violations of the
provisions of this Act are classified as misdemeanors punishable by
a fine not exceeding $500.00, or imprisonment not exceeding one
(1) year.
The Act also provides for contempt proceedings in connection with
hearings, and provides for mandatory appearance of witnesses, etc.,
upon proper application to the Court of Common Pleas. Actually,
it seems that either the Court of Common Pleas or the Court of Gen-
eral Sessions would have jurisdiction to issue the necessary sub-
poenas.
Prisoners - Allowance of Time for Good Conduct
By act approved May 11, 1955, the General Assembly provides
that good conduct credit, for the purpose of computation, shall only
19551
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be computed upon the time the prisoner actually serves, and shall not
be applicable to times when he is on parole or on probation and not
in custody.
Point System-Motor Vehicles
By Act approved April 15, 1955, the Legislature provided a
point system for evaluation of the operating record of persons hav-
ing driver's licenses. This replaces the old regulations made by the
South Carolina State Highway Department, which was successfully
attached in litigation originating in Greenville County, South Caro-
lina. The new Act sets up a graduated scale of points, and includes
a plea of guilty, plea of nolo contendere, and forfeiture of bail in
the term "conviction", which conviction is necessary before points
are placed against the licensee's record. The Act also provides for
a system of review by an agent of the South Carolina State Highway
Department, but does not provide for any system of appeal, or super-
sedeas in case of an adverse decision by the review agent.
Safe Cracking Statute Amended
By Act approved February 26, 1955, the Safe Cracking Statute,24
which provides that any person using explosives in and about a safe
with intent to commit larceny of money or other valuables to be guil-
ty of a felony and sentenced to life, et cetera, has been amended to
include any person convicted of using explosives, tools or other im-
plements in or about a safe used for keeping money or other valu-
ables with intent to commit larceny or other crimes, should be guilty
of a felony and be sentenced to the Penitentiary during the term of
his life, et cetera. This only adds to the law a provision that if any
instrument is used about a safe, life imprisonment may be the penal-
ty unless a jury recommends mercy.
Probationers -Release on Bond Pending Hearing
By Act approved March 1, 1955, Probationers, arrested for viola-
tion, are to be released upon bond pending a hearing, in the discretion
of the Magistrate, in the jurisdiction where the alleged violation of
probation occurred. Previously, Section 55-595 of the 1952 Code,
treating with this problem, did not provide for bond and a probationer
had to remain in jail until his cause was heard.
24. COs O1 LAWS OF SoumT CAROLINA, 1952 § 16-337.
[Vol. 8
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Increase Penalties - Sale of Narcotics to Persons Under
the Age of Eighteen Years
The penalty for selling, furnishing or giving narcotics to a person
under the age of eighteen (18) was increased by Act approved April
8, 1955, for the first offense: from a fine not exceeding $500.00 or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both, to a fine of
$5,000.00 or imprisonment for five (5) years or both; for any sub-
sequent offense, from a fine not exceeding $2,000.00 or imprisonment
not exceeding two (2) years or both, to a mandatory sentence of
ten (10) years imprisonment at hard labor of which there shall be
no probation or suspension. If the defendant be under eighteen (18)
for a first offense, sentence shall be in the discretion of the court.
Solicitors May Order Certain Autopsies
By Act approved April 18, 1955, the General Assembly gave the
solicitor of the circuit concerned the power to order an autopsy or
post mortem in the event the coroner should for any reason be un-
available.
Habitual Criminal Act
South Carolina's first Habitual Criminal Act provides for maxi-
mum sentence the third time anyone was convicted under the law of
any State, or of the United States, for the crime of murder and
other selected felonies, and for persons convicted for a fourth time
of any such felonies, a term of life imprisonment. The life sentence
is subject to review by said board for the maximum sentence for the
third offender. This act also provides that where a number of of-
fenses were committed at times so closely connected that they may
be considered as one, the court shall so consider them. On the other
hand, the Act provides that if the defendant had been convicted of
one or more crimes which were not taken into account at the time
of the imposition of the original sentence the court may issue its
Rule to Show Cause, upon ten-day notice, ruling defendant to show
why the former sentence should not be revoked and the defendant
sentenced under the Habitual Criminal Act. This Act was approved
April 8, 1955.
South Carolina State Board of Funeral Services
(Substitution of a Misdemeanor)
Replacing Chapter 11, Volume 5, Page 583 through 587 of the
1952 Code, the 1955 General Assembly created a South Carolina
1955]
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol8/iss1/8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
State Board of Funeral Service, and provided therein for the licens-
ing, inspecting and treatment of the bodies of the dead. By Sectiorr
10 of the Act, approved May 12, 1955, any person violating the pro-
visions of the Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punish-
able by a fine of not more than $1,000.00 or imprisonment for not
more than one year or both, in the discretion of the court.
IV. CASES PENDING
Now pending before the Supreme Court of South Carolina, or
headed in that direction, are certain cases which the practitioner might
be interested in in connection with some current question arising in
his office. An Appeal from the First Circuit: in the case of State
v. Samuel Wright, Jr., the defendant was tried and sentenced to
death on May 9, 1955. The electrocution date was set for June 17,
1955, and no Notice of Intention to Appeal was served upon the so-
licitor within the ten days prescribed by statute. On June 16, a
court-appointed attorney appeared before the Governor and secured
a stay until July 22. Thereafter, counsel for defendant attempted
to serve upon the solicitor of the First Circuit, Notice of Intention
to Appeal, based upon the executive order of the Governor, and the
solicitor declined to accept; the Notice of Appeal was served by
the Sheriff of Orangeburg County. The solicitor was again served
July 12, 1955, with Notice of Application for an Order Extending
Time to Appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds of newly dis-
covered evidence and this matter came on for a hearing before Judge
Brailsford on July 16, and he held that the circuit court was with-
out jurisdiction and overruled the motion for a new trial. on after-
discovered evidence, under the authority of State v. StricklandY"
On July 19, 1955, the attorney for the defendant attempted to serve
the solicitor with Notice of Intention to Appeal from Judge Brails-
ford's order, which the solicitor refused to accept and the next day
an attempt was made to file the Notice of Intention to Appeal with
the Clerk of the Supreme Court, who declined to accept same. On
July 21, the day before the date for execution, the Chief Justice
of the South Carolina Supreme Court passed an order staying the
execution. The case poses some very interesting propositions of law
on the question of jurisdiction, failure to file the Notice of Inten-
tion to Appeal, and possibly other questions.
In the case of State v. Hamp Jones, Jr., a murder case, defendant
made oral and written statements. During the course of the trial he
was examined on a written statement which was not introduced and
25. 201 S.C. 170, 22 S.E. 2d 417 (1940).
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was not relied upon by the State. The apparent question which will
be raised is the question of whether he could be examined on the
statement for the purpose of showing that he first falsified and later
told the truth. The appeal is from the Fourth Circuit.
In an appeal from the Tenth Circuit, in the case of the State v.
Willie Jenkins, from Anderson County, the defendant was found guil-
ty of manslaughter. There seems to have been no question of proof
of the corpus delicti, but the State relied upon the statement of the
accused that he did the shooting. The accused claimed self-defense
and defense of habitation, but the State's evidence showed that the
deceased was shot in the back and the apparent question which the
court will be called upon to decide will be the sufficiency of the evi-
dence.
In a case from the Thirteenth Circuit, State v. Horace Littlejohn,
the defendant was convicted for violation of the Liquor Law. The
defendant operated and owned a "beer joint" near Clemson and one
of his employees, a female, lived in an apartment upstairs in the
same building. Fifteen pints of legal whiskey were found under the
bed in the employee's apartment and defendant was convicted of hav-
ing legal liquor in a place of business. The apparent question is
the possession and control of the defendant over the whiskey in ques-
tion, and the sufficiency of evidence of possession.
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